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The effect of the capital gains tax on the sale of capital assets and the 
realization  of  gains on these assets has been a matter of  substantial 
academic and political controversy. Capital gains are only taxed when 
an  asset is sold, so inclusion  of  gains  in  taxable  income is  largely 
discretionary from the point of view of the taxpayer. As a result, sen- 
sitivity to tax rates is probably greater for capital gains income than 
for other kinds of  income. 
This sensitivity may take a number of forms. Capital gains and losses 
on assets held for less than a specified time period, currently six months, 
are taxed as .ordinary income, while gains and losses on assets held 
for longer periods of time are taxed at lower rates. Planning of sales 
around this capital gains holding period was studied by Kaplan (1981), 
who concluded that eliminating the distinction between long-term and 
short-term gains and taxing all assets under current long-term rules 
would enhance capital gains tax revenue. Fredland, Gray, and Sunley 
(1968) also found that the length of the holding period had a significant 
effect on the timing of asset sales. 
The deferral of taxes on capital gains until realization enhances the 
incentive to postpone selling assets. A taxpayer might defer selling one 
asset and purchasing another with a higher pretax return because capital 
gains tax on the sale makes the transaction unprofitable. This is known 
as the “lock-in”  effect. Feldstein, Slemrod, and Yitzhaki (1980) esti- 
mated that the effect of lock-in was substantial enough to imply that a 
reduction in tax rates from their 1978 levels would increase tax revenue. 
Their study focused on sales of common stock using 1973 tax return 
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data. The results mirrored those of an earlier work by Feldstein and 
Yitzhaki (1977), which relies on data from the 1963-64 Federal Reserve 
Board Survey of the Financial Characteristics of Consumers. 
Brannon (1974) found  evidence of  reduced  realizations  of  capital 
gains as a result of tax rate increases in 1970 and 1971. A lock-in effect 
was also identified by Auten (1979). Later work by Auten and Clotfelter 
(1979) found a substantially greater sensitivity of capital gains reali- 
zations to short-term fluctuations  in  the tax rate than to long-term, 
average tax rate levels. Minarik (1981) studied the lock-in effect and 
concluded that a 1% reduction in the capital gains tax rate would raise 
realizations, but by substantially less than 1%. The U.S. Department 
of the Treasury (1985) released a report to the Congress that presented 
substantially higher estimates of  the elasticity of  capital gains reali- 
zations to tax rates and concluded that the tax rate reductions of 1978 
had the effect of  increasing capital gains tax revenue. 
The objective  of  the present paper is to examine the relationship 
among capital gains tax rates, the level of realizations of long-term 
gains subject to tax, and revenues from capital gains taxation over an 
extended period of time. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 began an era of 
high variability in the capital gains tax rate, which had been relatively 
constant for the preceding fifteen years.  Further changes in the tax 
reform bills of 1976, 1978, and 1981 continued this variability. Smaller 
changes in the capital gains tax rate occurred in intervening years due 
to changes in ordinary tax rates, changes in other provisions of the tax 
law, and bracket creep. 
The changes in the effective capital gains tax rate that resulted from 
these laws were quite complex and often involved the interaction of 
several provisions. This paper estimates the effective marginal tax rate 
on capital gains for various income groups over the period  1965-82. 
The tax rate calculations use the detailed tabulation data of personal 
income tax returns provided by the Statistics of  Income. These cal- 
culations show smaller actual variability in rates than  suggested  by 
other studies that relied on calculations of maximum effective tax rates. 
Sector balance sheets and reconciliation statements from the Federal 
Reserve Board’s Flow of  Funds series are used to estimate the level 
and composition of the wealth of the household sector. This data also 
provide estimates of  the change in the value of these holdings caused 
by movements in asset prices. These changes are closely related to the 
stock of  unrealized capital gains in the household sector, which is the 
base from which capital gains are realized and reported on tax returns. 
2.1  Measuring Capital Gains Tax  Rates 
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 distinguished between gains on 
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taxed  as ordinary income, while the latter, termed long-term gains, 
were given a 50% exclusion from taxable income. However, this ex- 
clusion was limited to net capital gains: long-term gains in excess of 
short-term losses. Therefore, to the extent that long-term gains simply 
canceled short-term losses, the long-term marginal tax rate equaled the 
short-term rate, which was the same as the tax rate on ordinary income. 
Poterba  (1985) examined  1982 tax return data and found that tax- 
payers with net long-term gains composed the majority of all returns 
reporting capital gains or losses. He noted, however, that a sizable 
fraction of taxpayers were  subject to the capital loss limitation and 
therefore could realize additional long-term gains without incurring any 
additional current tax liability. These taxpayers are unaffected by the 
current marginal tax rate on capital gains, generate no capital gains tax 
liability, and are therefore neglected in the present study. 
This study focuses only on taxpayers with long-term gains in excess 
of  short-term losses.  Inclusion  of  taxpayers with net  capital losses 
would imply a lower level of capital gains revenue and a lower revenue- 
maximizing capital gains tax rate than is reported here. The current 
rule is that the tax rate on these net long-term gains is 40% of a tax- 
payer’s ordinary rate. Since ordinary rates currently go up to 50%, the 
top marginal tax rate on long-term gains is 20%. 
Prior to 1982, the top tax rate on capital gains was always higher 
than this. Ordinary tax rates ranged up to 70% in earlier years. Prior 
to November 1978, half of all capital gains were subject to tax, not the 
current 40%. In addition, there were a number of other provisions of 
the tax code $hat affected the capital gains tax rate. These included the 
Alternative Tax Computation, the Additional Minimum Tax, the Max- 
imum Tax on Personal Service Income, and the Alternative Minimum 
Tax. The effect of each was calculated using detailed tabulation from 
the Statistics of Income. 
The Alternative  Tax  Computation permitted taxpayers to limit the 
marginal tax rate on at least some of their capital gains to 25%. Although 
this provision is generally described as having “effectively truncated 
the tax rate schedule,”’ careful analysis of the data suggests that this 
was not the case. 
Prior to 1970, taxpayers could calculate their tax using the ordinary 
tax schedule to compute the tax on their non-capital-gains income and 
adding 50% of their taxable capital gains to figure their total tax. Tax- 
payers could pay either this “alternative”  amount or the tax they would 
owe using the ordinary tax consumption. However, because of the way 
the tax was designed, a significant fraction of high-income capital gains 
1. See, e.g.,  the U.S. Department of Treasury’s report to the Congress on the capital 
gains tax reductions of  1978, p. 35. A similar statement appears in the description of the 
alternative tax computation in the Statistics of Income 1966: “The effect of  this com- 
putation was a maximum tax of 25 percent on net long-term capital gain”  (p. 164). 20  Lawrence B. Lindsey 
taxpayers did not choose the alternative tax but paid the ordinary tax: 
it involved a higher marginal tax rate but a lower average tax rate on 
their capital gains income. For example, in 1966, one-sixth of all capital 
gains taxpayers with adjusted gross income (AGI) between  $200,000 
and $500,000 paid the ordinary tax, as did one-quarter with AGI be- 
tween $100,000 and $200,000.2 
Consider the taxpayer with long-term gains of $200,000, other income 
of  $50,000, and exclusions and itemized deductions of $40,000. The 
taxpayer excludes half  of  the long-term  gain from  taxable  income, 
leaving an AGI of $150,000 and a taxable income of $110,000. Using 
the tax schedule of the era (1965-69),  the ordinary tax computation 
would produce a tax liability of $51,380, but the alternative tax com- 
putation involved a tax of $51,820. 
This taxpayer would elect to be taxed under the ordinary schedule 
because it produced a lower tax liability. However, the marginal tax 
rate on capital gains under the ordinary method is 3  1%  compared with 
the 25% under the alternative method. Due to the design of the tax, 
the alternative method could produce a higher average tax rate even 
though it produced a lower marginal tax rate. 
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 changed the alternative tax computation 
by limiting the lower marginal rate to the first $50,000 of net long-term 
capital gains. As a result of this change, less than half of high-income 
taxpayers had a low marginal tax rate on capital gains because of the 
alternative tax computation. In spite of the ineffectiveness of this pro- 
vision at the margin, a substantial amount of tax revenue was lost by 
extending the inframarginal benefit to these taxpayers. The net results 
were a low tax rate on capital gains that the taxpayer was going to 
realize anyway and a high tax rate on capital gains about which the 
taxpayer was undecided. This produced the wrong type of incentive 
system for generating capital gains tax revenue. 
The Additional Minimum Tax was levied in two forms, one from 1970 
through 1975 and one from 1976 through 1978. Both had the peculiar 
feature of lowering the additional tax rate as the taxpayer’s taxable 
income rose. Under the Additional Minimum Tax, a taxpayer summed 
a list of tax preference items that included  the excluded portion  of 
capital gains and paid a tax on the excess of this amount over a base. 
In the early version of the tax, this base was the sum of $30,000 plus 
the taxpayer’s ordinary tax liability. Later, this base was lowered to 
the greater of $10,000 or one-half of the taxpayer’s ordinary tax liability. 
In either event,  as the taxpayer’s ordinary  taxes rose,  this base 
amount, termed an “offset,” also increased. When a taxpayer realized 
an additional dollar of capital gains, the excluded fifty cents entered 
2. These data were derived from the Statistics of  Income 1966, p. 94. 21  Rates, Realizations, and Revenues of Capital Gains 
the minimum tax as a preference, while the rest was taxed at ordinary 
tax rates, thus also increasing the offset. At a capital gains tax rate of 
25%, half of the preference was offset. At  a rate of  35%,  thirty-five 
cents of the fifty-cent capital gains preference was offset. So, at high 
ordinary tax rates, the amount subject to the minimum tax was lower, 
and the additional minimum tax rate was correspondingly lower. 
The changes in 1976 not only reduced the tax base but also increased 
the additional tax rate from 10% to 15%. The IRS estimates that this 
resulted in an elevenfold increase in the number of  taxpayers paying 
the minimum tax and a sixfold increase in minimum tax  revenue^.^ 
The Maximum Tax on Personal Service Income, enacted as part of 
the Tax  Refom Act of  1969, lowered the tax rate on wage, salary, 
and professional income below that on other types of income for many 
taxpayers.  Instead of  the  statutory 70%  top  rate, the  tax  rate  on 
personal service income was taxed at 60% in 1971 and 50% thereafter. 
As Lindsey (1981) showed, the maximum tax was ineffective at achiev- 
ing this lower rate for the vast majority of  high-income taxpayers. 
However, a complex interaction between the maximum tax and capital 
gains  had  the effect of  raising the capital gains tax  rate for many 
taxpayers. 
Every dollar of  capital gains income converted a dollar of  earned 
income, taxed at the low rate, into “unearned” income, taxed at the 
higher rate. This had the effect of  adding as much as ten percentage 
points to the effective capital gains tax rate. The conversion of earned 
into unearned income due to capital gains became known as “poisoning.” 
Changes in the rules on poisoning in 1976 dramatically increased the 
effect of  this provision. For example, the effect on the capital gains 
tax rate for taxpayers in  the $100,000-$200,000  income group rose 
sixfold between 1976 and 1977. This led to a dramatic upward shift in 
the capital gains tax rate until poisoning was eliminated in  1979. 
The Alternative Minimum Tax replaced the Additional Minimum Tax 
on capital gains beginning in  1979. This tax was levied at lo%, 20%, 
or 25% on a tax base that was broader than the ordinary tax base. The 
taxpayer had to pay the greater of  his ordinary tax or his alternative 
minimum tax.  Since these tax  rates were generally lower than the 
ordinary tax rates on capital gains, the alternative minimum tax lowered 
the effective tax rate on capital gains. 
Table 2.1 presents calculations of the average effective tax rate on 
capital gains faced by taxpayers with net long-term capital gains. The 
calculations weighted all taxpayers with net gains equally in order to 
minimize the statistical simultaneity between the tax rate and the level 
of  realizations. The tax rates in table 2.1 reflect the effects of  each of 
3. These data were presented in Statistics of Income 1976, table 3B, p. 83. 22  Lawrence B. Lindsey 
Table 2.1  Average Effective Marginal Tar  Rate on Capital Gains 
Income  Class 
Under  $50,000-  $100,000-  $200,000-  $500,000-  Over 
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the provisions discussed here and other changes in the tax law that 
occurred during this period. 
2.2  The Value of Personal Assets 
Evaluation of the importance of capital gains tax rates in determining 
the level of  realizations is complicated by  changes in  the value of 
personal wealth including accrued but unrealized gains. The Federal 
Reserve Board issues a quarterly Flow ofFunds report on the holdings 
of various sectors of the U.S. economy, including the household sector, 
which is the focus of  this study. 
The components of  household wealth include many elements such 
as cash, checking and saving deposits, and pension fund and insurance 
wealth  on which taxpayers do not realize capital gains. This study 
therefore grouped household wealth into nontraded assets such as these 
and tradeable assets on which taxable capital gains are reported and 
taxed. 
Tradeable assets include land, residential structures, corporate equ- 
ities, and equity in noncorporate businesses. This last category includes 
the value of  nonresidential real estate held by  households. Tangible 
assets, such as consumer durables, that are seldom traded were ex- 
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hold wealth over the period of the study. They also accounted for some 
97% of  the value of capital gains reported on tax  return^.^ 
The components of  this tradeable wealth varied over time. For ex- 
ample, nonresidential real estate peaked at 39.4% at the beginning of 
the period. Corporate equities fell from nearly 23% of  total wealth in 
1968 to only 9.5% in  1979. 
In order to model this variation, household wealth was apportioned 
among six income groups on a component-by-component basis. Each 
component of  wealth was allocated according to the distribution of 
income likely to flow from it, as reported on tax returns. For example, 
the distribution of corporate equities in a given year was assumed to 
be the same as the distribution of dividends reported in that year. 
Shares of wealth were therefore determined from the same tax-based 
data as the distribution of  reported capit9 gains. Observations on in- 
dividual income classes in each year were therefore independent of 
observations in other years. At the same time, the aggregate level of 
wealth was  determined independently of  the  data on capital gains 
realizations. 
The Flow of Funds data also include sectoral reconciliation state- 
ments that estimate the change in asset prices. These revaluations were 
computed for periods ranging from one to seven years. They were 
converted into inflation-adjusted  terms to reflect the real value of asset 
appreciation for each year studied. However, the data suggested that 
revaluation periods of more than one year did not significantly affect 
the rate of realizations. Rather, accrued capital gains over long periods 
became indistinguishable from other types of  wealth. 
2.3  Econometric Results 
The data on capital gains tax rates, realizations, and household wealth 
were  analyzed  statistically.  The  basic  results  showed  that  a  one- 
percentage-point reduction in the capital gains tax rate resulted in 6.2% 
more net gains realized. The implication of this finding is that revenues 
from capital gains taxes are maximized when the capital gains tax rate 
is  16%. At higher tax rates, the revenue gained from taxing realized 
gains at higher rates is more than offset by a reduction in the amount 
of capital gains realized. At lower tax rates, the revenue lost from the 
lower rate is not recouped by  the broadening of  the tax base. This 
estimate of the revenue-maximizing rate is best interpreted as being in 
the center of a range of  possible rates from 14.3%  to 18.5%. 
Capital gains realizations also appeared to rise in direct proportion 
to the value of traded assets in household wealth. This is as expected. 
4. This was calculated from U.S.  Department of Treasury’s (1985) report to the Con- 
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Realizations also turned out to be negatively related to the level of 
nontraded wealth such as cash. If capital gains were often realized for 
consumption purposes, we would expect this result. When households 
have a great deal of  cash and other liquid assets, they have less need 
to sell assets to finance consumption. The statistical results also suggest 
that a rise in the value of household wealth caused by rising asset prices 
induces more realizations, as expected. 
These results were tested against a number of  econometric specifi- 
cations. The result was a range of  estimates of  the effect of tax rates 
from a 5.1% increase in realizations per point drop in tax rates to a 
7.4% increase in realizations per point drop in tax rates. These results 
suggested a range of  revenue maximizing capital gains tax rates of 
13.5% 20%. 
It is also likely that a good deal of any increased realization caused 
by a decrease in the tax rate is temporary. The data showed that the 
overall response of  6.2% more realizations per point of  the tax rate 
was the combination of  a first-year response of  8.4% per point and a 
long-run response of  5.4% per percentage point of  the tax rate. This 
in turn implies that a long-run revenue-maximizing tax rate would be 
18.5%. 
The high responsiveness of  capital gains realizations to tax rates is 
unlikely to be duplicated in other areas of the income tax. Taxed com- 
modities such as labor supply will show comparatively little response 
to reductions in marginal tax rates because a relatively high proportion 
of  the maximum possible level of  supply is already in the market. By 
contrast, only a very small portion of existing capital gains are realized 
in a given year. 
For example, total capital gains realized in 1982 amounted to a record 
$86.1 billion.  But the revaluation in personally traded assets during 
that year alone was $306 billion, implying that realizations accounted 
for only 28.2% of that year’s gains. In the high tax year of  1978, only 
$48.6 billion of gains were realized on total revaluations of $694 billion, 
or 7%.  Clearly, the potential for increased realizations in  1978 was 
substantial. The large and growing stock of  unrealized capital gains 
makes possible significant taxpayer responsiveness to the cost of  re- 
alization. This in turn makes capital gains tax rates far more sensitive 
than other types of income. 
Finally, it is important to stress that taxation of  any commodity at 
its revenue-maximizing level is not optimal in any economic sense. 
The last dollars of  revenue collected at the revenue-maximizing rate 
created enormous burdens on the economy relative to the extra dol- 
lars raised. The conclusions stated here can only be interpreted as 
implying that rates above the revenue-maximizing level are counter- 
productive. 25  Rates, Realizations, and Revenues of Capital Gains 
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